v. Docket No. 99-20-527
KANAWHA COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Respondent.
Any party may appeal this decision to the Circuit Court of Kanawha County or to the
Circuit Court of the Kanawha County. Any such appeal must be filed within thirty (30) days
of receipt of this decision. W. Va. Code § 18-29-7. Neither the West Virginia Educationand State Employees Grievance Board nor any of its Administrative Law Judges is a party
to such appeal, and should not be so named. However, the appealing party is required by
W. Va. Code § 29A-5-4(b) to serve a copy of the appeal petition upon the Grievance
Board. The appealing party must also provide the Board with the civil action number so
that the record can be prepared and properly transmitted to the appropriate circuit court.
___________________________________
Dated: March 13, 2000
I coach both Boys and Girls Tennis at George Washington High School. I
am scheduled to receive 1.5 times the single salary. However, the work is
double - twice as many matches, double paperwork, and twice the players
and students. I believe I am entitled to both full salaries.
This grievance was denied at Level I on November 11, 1999. Grievant appealed
to Level II, and a Level II hearing was conducted on November 15, 1999. This grievance
was denied at Level II on December 14, 1999. Grievant appealed to Level IV on
December 21, 1999, and a Level IV hearing was held on January 25, 2000. This case
became mature for decision on that date as the parties did not wish to submit proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law.
(See footnote 1)
Grievant argues the coaching of both tennis teams is twice the work, and she should
receive twice the pay. Respondent notes the teams practice and play their matches at the
same time; thus, the amount of time Grievant must spend coaching in this set ofcircumstances is not equal to coaching two separate teams. Respondent also points out
Grievant knew the conditions of the contract when she accepted it.
After a detailed review of the record in its entirety, the undersigned Administrative
Law Judge makes the following Findings of Fact.
1. Grievant applied for and received the contract to coach both the girls' and
boys' tennis teams at George Washington High School.
2. Grievant knew at the time she applied for these positions, that the "salar[y]
for coaching both the boys and girls in one sport was 1½ the compensation of coaching
either sport" as this statement is written on the top of KCBOE's "Coaching/ Extra-Curricular
Assignments" sheet which identifies the compensation and pay dates for all sports. Res.
Exh. 2, at Level II.
3. Grievant was sent a contract for her extracurricular assignment which
identified Grievant's compensation for coaching the girls' and boys' teams as $1,500.00,
or 1.5 times the compensation for coaching two separate teams.
4. Grievant signed this extracurricular assignment contract on October 25, 1999,
but added the following statement on the bottom: "I do not agree with the 1.5 rule[,] if I
coach both teams; I am coaching twice as many matches[,] twice as many athletes[,] twice
the paperwork."
5. The boys' and girls' tennis team practice at the same time, the matches are
conducted in the same place at the same time, and the paperwork that must be completed
for each team is essentially the same. 6. For the past seven years, KCBOE has paid coaches, who coach both the
girls' and boys' team in sports that practice and have their matches at the same time, 1½
times the amount, applicable for coaching only one team in that sport.
7. The sports in which this practice usually occurs are track, cross-country, and
tennis.
As this grievance does not involve a disciplinary matter, Grievant has the burden of
proving her grievance by a preponderance of the evidence. Procedural Rules of the
W. Va. Educ. & State Employees Grievance Bd. 156 C.S.R. 1 § 4.19 (1996); Toney v.
Lincoln County Bd. of Educ., Docket No. 99-22-046 (Apr. 23, 1999); Bowen v. Kanawha
County Bd. of Educ., Docket No. 99-20-039 (Mar. 30, 1999); Holly v. Logan County Bd.
of Educ., Docket No. 96-23-174 (Apr. 30, 1997). See W. Va. Code § 18-29-6.
W. Va. Code § 18A-4-16 controls extracurricular assignments. This Code Section
reads in pertinent part:
(1) The assignment of teachers and service personnel to extracurricular
assignments shall be made only by mutual agreement of the employee and
the superintendent, or designated representative, subject to board approval.
Extracurricular duties shall mean, but not be limited to, any activities that
occur at times other than regularly scheduled working hours, which include
the instructing, coaching, chaperoning, escorting, providing support services
or caring for the needs of students, and which occur on a regularly scheduled
basis: Provided, That all school service personnel assignments shall be
considered extracurricular assignments, except such assignments as are
considered either regular positions, as provided by section eight [§ 18A-4-8]
of this article, or extra-duty assignments, as provided by section eight-b [§
18A-4-8b] of this article.
(3) The terms and conditions of the agreement between the employee and
the board shall be in writing and signed by both parties.
Grievant presented no evidence to demonstrate that any rule, regulation, past
practice, or statute has been violated. It is clear KCBOE's policy on extracurricular
assignment compensation does not violate the above-cited statute. Given this set of
events the correct standard by which to assess KCBOE's action would be to assess if it
was arbitrary and capricious or clearly wrong.
"Generally, an action is considered arbitrary and capricious if the agency did not rely
on criteria intended to be considered, explained or reached the decision in a manner
contrary to the evidence before it, or reached a decision that was so implausible that it
cannot be ascribed to a difference of opinion. See Bedford County Memorial Hosp. v.
Health and Human Serv., 769 F.2d 1017 (4th Cir. 1985); Yokum v. W. Va. Schools for the
Deaf and the Blind, Docket No. 96-DOE-081 (Oct. 16, 1996)." Trimboli v. Dep't of Health
and Human Resources, Docket No. 93-HHR-322 (June 27, 1997). Arbitrary and capricious
actions have been found to be closely related to ones that are unreasonable. State ex rel.
Eads v. Duncil, 198 W. Va. 604, 474 S.E.2d 534 (1996). An action is recognized as
arbitrary and capricious when "it is unreasonable, without consideration, and in disregard
of facts and circumstances of the case." Eads, supra (citing Arlington Hosp. v. Schweiker,
547 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. Va. 1982)). "While a searching inquiry into the facts is required to
determine if an action was arbitrary and capricious, the scope of review is narrow, and an
administrative law judge may not simply substitute her judgment for that of a board ofeducation. See generally, Harrison v. Ginsberg, [169 W. Va. 162], 286 S.E.2d 276, 283
(W. Va. 1982)." Trimboli, supra.
The action of KCBOE cannot be found to be arbitrary and capricious or
unreasonable. While it is true that it takes more time to coach two tennis teams, it is also
true that it does not take twice as much time, as the practices and meets are conducted
at the same time.
(See footnote 2)
The above-discussion will be supplemented by the following Conclusions of Law.
1. As this grievance does not involve a disciplinary matter, Grievant has the
burden of proving her grievance by a preponderance of the evidence. Procedural Rules
of the W. Va. Educ. & State Employees Grievance Bd. 156 C.S.R. 1 § 4.19 (1996); Toney
v. Lincoln County Bd. of Educ., Docket No. 99-22-046 (Apr. 23, 1999); Bowen v. Kanawha
County Bd. of Educ., Docket No. 99-20-039 (Mar. 30, 1999); Holly v. Logan County Bd.
of Educ., Docket No. 96-23-174 (Apr. 30, 1997). See W. Va. Code § 18-29-6.
2. In this set of circumstances, the correct standard for assessing KCBOE's
action is the arbitrary and capricious standard.
3. "Generally, an action is considered arbitrary and capricious if the agency did
not rely on criteria intended to be considered, explained or reached the decision in amanner contrary to the evidence before it, or reached a decision that was so implausible
that it cannot be ascribed to a difference of opinion. See Bedford County Memorial Hosp.
v. Health and Human Serv., 769 F.2d 1017 (4th Cir. 1985); Yokum v. W. Va. Schools for
the Deaf and the Blind, Docket No. 96-DOE-081 (Oct. 16, 1996)." Trimboli v. Dep't of
Health and Human Resources, Docket No. 93-HHR-322 (June 27, 1997). Arbitrary and
capricious actions have been found to be closely related to ones that are unreasonable.
State ex rel. Eads v. Duncil, 198 W. Va. 604, 474 S.E.2d 534 (1996). An action is
recognized as arbitrary and capricious when "it is unreasonable, without consideration, and
in disregard of facts and circumstances of the case." Eads, supra (citing Arlington Hosp.
v. Schweiker, 547 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. Va. 1982)). "While a searching inquiry into the facts
is required to determine if an action was arbitrary and capricious, the scope of review is
narrow, and an administrative law judge may not simply substitute her judgment for that
of a board of education. See generally, Harrison v. Ginsberg, [169 W. Va. 162], 286
S.E.2d 276, 283 (W. Va. 1982)." Trimboli, supra.
4. KCBOE's practice of compensating certain coaches at 1.5 the normal rate
when they coach two teams which practice at the same time and have other similarities
is not arbitrary and capricious or unreasonable.
Accordingly, this grievance is DENIED.
JANIS I. REYNOLDS
Administrative Law Judge
Footnote: 1
Footnote: 2