WEST VIRGINIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES

GRIEVANCE BOARD

TAMMY BELMONT, et al.,

Grievants,

v. Docket No. 04-HHR-149(I)

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN RESOURCES/BUREAU
FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES
and DIVISION OF PERSONNEL,

Respondents.

DECISION

This grievance was filed by numerous employees of the Department of Health and Human Resources' ("DHHR"), Bureau for Children and Families ("BCF"), as a result of new classifications and pay grade assignments which were implemented for positions within the Bureau for Child Support Enforcement ("BCSE") in 2003. Many employees of BCF have requested that a "series" be created for their classifications and that their classifications be placed in higher pay grades, similar to the benefits conferred upon the newly-created BCSE classifications. Grievants are Family Support Supervisors and believe that their classification should be given a "career ladder," or series, similar to that created for the classifications of Child Support Supervisor 1 and 2.

Procedural History

In October of 2003, approximately 250 individuals filed these grievances around the state. After denials at levels one and two, the various grievances were consolidated at level three, and the Division of Personnel ("DOP") was joined as an indispensable party. A level three hearing was conducted, in person and by videoconferencing, before David M. Adkins, DHHR Grievance Evaluator, on November 21, 2003, January 30, 2004, and March 9, 2004. The grievances were denied by level three decision dated April 15, 2004.

Upon appeal to level four, these cases were ultimately divided into separate grievances, according to job classifications. A level four hearing was conducted in Charleston, West Virginia, on April 16, 2007, at which Grievants were represented by counsel, Christopher Moffatt; DHHR was represented by B. Allen Campbell, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and DOP was represented by Karen O. Thornton, Assistant Attorney General. Although given the option to file fact/law proposals at the conclusion of all of these related grievances, Respondents elected to rely upon the proposals filed on October 10, 2006, after the conclusion of the initial level four hearing in *Posey v. Department of Health and Human Resources*, Docket No. 04-HHR-149(A) (Sept. 17, 2007). Grievants' counsel's proposals were received by this Grievance Board on May 1, 2007.

Due to the resignation of Chief Administrative Law Judge Paul Marteney, this matter was reassigned to the undersigned on August 18, 2007. The undersigned has been provided with, and has reviewed, the entirety of the level three record, along with the recordings of the proceedings conducted at level four.

Synopsis

Grievants are employed as Family Support Supervisors. They contend that their classification should be divided into a series, or "career ladder," similar to that which was created within the BCSE for Child Support Supervisor 1 and 2. Evidence in this andrelated cases established that the supervisors in the child support division perform different duties and supervise different job classifications, while all Family Support Supervisors supervise Family Support Specialists, who provide case management services to public assistance clients who are seeking employment. In addition, the changes within the BCSE were implemented because of severe recruitment and retention problems in that division. Grievants are not similarly situated to the child support employees, are employed in a different division, and have failed to prove entitlement to the relief

requested.

Based upon a detailed review of the record in its entirety, the undersigned makes the following findings of fact:

Findings of Fact

1. Grievants are employed by the BCF as Family Support Supervisors ("FSS"). The FSS classification is assigned to Pay Grade 13, with an annual salary range of $23,784 to $43,992.

2. Pursuant to a request from its former commissioner, and as the result of severe recruitment and retention problems, DOP conducted a classification study of various positions within the Bureau of Child Support Enforcement ("BCSE"). As a result of the study, in January of 2001, DOP recommended the creation of several new classifications, including Child Support Technician 1 and 2, Child Support Paralegal, Child Support Specialist 1, 2, and 3 ("CSS"), Child Support Supervisor 1 and 2, and Child Support Regional Manager.

3. In 2002, BCSE Commissioner Susan Shelton Perry submitted a request for approval of the implementation of the new classifications, but it was rejected by the DHHR Secretary, because DHHR could not provide the necessary funding. Although most of thefunds were to be provided by federal sources, DHHR was asked to provide nearly $1,000,000 of the necessary money.

4. On September 1, 2003, the State Personnel Board approved the creation of the new BCSE classifications, prompting the filing of the instant grievances. Virtually all of the funding for this program was provided by the federal government, through matching and incentive funds designated for child support issues, based upon the West Virginia program's performance. These federal funds are only to be used by BCSE and cannot be "shared" with any other division of DHHR.

5. All FSSs perform the same job function, which is to supervise employees of the Family Support Unit, whose primary function is to administer services to clients receiving state financial assistance and who are seeking employment through West Virginia Works and other programs.

6. Child Support Supervisors ("CSS") are divided into two classifications. CSS 1s supervise Child Support Technicians, who perform financial duties and handle the accounting aspects of child support collection. CSS 2s supervise Child Support Specialists, who work alongside attorneys and perform duties associated with child support casework. (See footnote 1)

7. CSS 1 is assigned to Pay Grade 13, and CSS 2 is assigned to Pay Grade 15.

Discussion

As this grievance does not involve a disciplinary matter, Grievants have the burden of proving their grievance by a preponderance of the evidence. Procedural Rules of the W. Va. Educ. & State Employees Grievance Bd. 156 C.S.R. 1 § 4.21 (2004); *Howell v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res*., Docket No. 89-DHS-72 (Nov. 29, 1990). *See* W. Va. Code § 29-6A-6. (See footnote 2) *See also Holly v. Logan County Bd. of Educ*., Docket No. 96-23-174 (Apr. 30, 1997); *Hanshaw v. McDowell County Bd. of Educ*., Docket No. 33-88-130 (Aug. 19, 1988). "The preponderance standard generally requires proof that a reasonable person would accept as sufficient that a contested fact is more likely true than not." *Leichliter v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res.*, Docket No. 92-HHR-486 (May 17, 1993).

Grievants' allegations are virtually identical to those raised by Child Protective Service Supervisors in *Bostic/Pomeroy v. Department of Health and Human Resources*, Docket No. 04-HHR-149(D) (Oct. 10, 2007). As in that case, Grievants are not claiming misclassification or asking for additional pay, but only allege that they should be given the option of the “career ladder” that was created for Child Support Supervisors. As stated by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, an employee who alleges impropriety regarding a reclassification action or challenges the pay grade to which his or her position is assigned bears the burden of proving the claim by a preponderance of the evidence. This is a difficult undertaking. *W. Va. Dep't of Health v. Blankenship*, 189 W. Va. 342, 431 S.E.2d 681 (1993); *Bennett v. Dep't of Health and Human Res.*, Docket No. 93-HHR-518 (June 23, 1995); *Johnston v. W. Va. Dep't of Health and Human Res.*, Docket No. 94-HHR-206 (June 15, 1995); *Thibault v. W. Va. Div. of Rehab. Serv.*, Docket No. 94- RS-061 (May 31, 1995); *Frame v. W. Va. Dep't of Health and Human Res.*, Docket No. 94- HHR-140 (Nov. 29, 1994). The Grievance Board's role is not to act as an expert in matters of classification of positions, job market analysis, and compensation schemes, or to substitute its judgment in place of DOP. *Moore v. W. Va. Dep't of Health and Human Res./Div. of Personnel*, Docket No. 94-HHR-126 (Aug. 26, 1994). Rather, the role of the Grievance Board is to review the information provided and assess whether the actions taken were arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion. *See Kyle v. W. Va. State Bd. of Rehab.*, Docket No. VR-88-006 (Mar. 28, 1989).

"Generally, an action is considered arbitrary and capricious if the agency did not rely on criteria intended to be considered, explained or reached the decision in a manner contrary to the evidence

before it, or reached a decision that was so implausible that it cannot be ascribed to a difference of opinion. *See Bedford County Memorial Hosp. v. Health and Human Serv.*, 769 F.2d 1017 (4th Cir. 1985); *Yokum v. W. Va. Schools for the Deaf and the Blind*, Docket No. 96-DOE-081 (Oct. 16, 1996)." *Trimboli v. Dep't of Health and Human Res.*, Docket No. 93-HHR-322 (June 27, 1997). Arbitrary and capriciousactions have been found to be closely related to ones that are unreasonable. *State ex rel. Eads v. Duncil*, 196 W. Va. 604, 474 S.E.2d 534 (1996). An action is recognized as arbitrary and capricious when "it is unreasonable, without consideration, and in disregard of facts and circumstances of the case." *Id*. (*citing Arlington Hosp. v. Schweiker*, 547 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. Va. 1982)). The arbitrary and capricious standard is a high one, requiring willful and unreasonable action and disregard of known facts.

Grievants further allege that it is discriminatory and constitutes favoritism for the Child Support Supervisors to be given the benefit of a career ladder that Grievants were not. West Virginia Code § 29-6A-2(d) defines "'discrimination'" as "any differences in the treatment of employees unless such differences are related to the actual job responsibilities of the employees or agreed to in writing by the employees." "'Favoritism'" is defined by Code § 29-6A-2(h) as "unfair treatment of an employee as demonstrated by preferential, exceptional or advantageous treatment of another or other employees." The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has recently clarified that, in order to establish either a discrimination or favoritism claim asserted under the grievance statutes, an employee must prove:

> (a) that he or she has been treated differently from one or more similarly-situated employee(s);
>
> (b) that the different treatment is not related to the actual job responsibilities of the employees; and,
>
> (c) that the difference in treatment was not agreed to in writing by the employee.

Frymier v. Higher Education Policy Comm., Nos. 32163 and 33296 (W.Va., Oct. 12, 2007); *See Bd. of Educ. v. White*, 216 W.Va. 242, 605 S.E.2d 814 (2004); *Chaddock v. Div. ofCorr.,* Docket No. 04-CORR-278 (2005). In *Frymier*, the Court acknowledged what this Board's cases have consistently held, i.e. that the elements of discrimination and favoritism are essentially identical. *Frymier v.*

Glenville State College, Docket No. 03-HE-217R (Nov. 16, 2004); *Kincaid v. Div. of Corrections*, Docket No. 98-CORR-144 (Nov. 23, 1998); *Prince v. Wayne County Bd. of Educ.,* Docket No. 90-50-281 (Jan. 28, 1990).

Grievants are not similarly situated to Child Support Supervisors, as was concluded with regard to the Protective Service Supervisors in *Bostic*, *supra*. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held in *Flint v. Wood County Board of Education*, 207 W. Va. 251, 531 S.E.2d 76 (1999) that to be considered similarly situated, the employees must be in the same classification as the employees to whom they compare themselves. The Court stated "the first prerequisite for establishing . . . discrimination or favoritism is a showing that the grievant is similarly situated, in a pertinent way, to one or more other employees." (See footnote 3) The Court found the grievants could not make such a showing because they were not in the same classifications as those to whom they compared themselves, because "[o]bviously employees who do not have the same classifications are not performing 'like assignments and duties.'" This ruling was confirmed in *Airhart v. Wood County Board of Education*, 212 W. Va. 175, 569 S.E.2d 422 (2002), and has similarly been applied to state employees. *See Farley v. West Virginia Parkways Economic Development and Tourism Authority*, Docket No. 00-PEDTA-015 (June 22, 2000). Grievants are not in the same classification, are employed within a different division of DHHR, and do not perform the same duties as the Child Support Supervisors, so discrimination and favoritism have not been established. As stated in *Bostic*:

> Respondents have provided uncontroverted evidence that establishes that the so-called career ladder for CSSs was created only to address the specific job duties assigned to those classifications. Each classification of supervisors is responsible for supervising a specific group of employees, who perform different functions within the area of child support. No such situation exists with regard to CPS Supervisors, so there is no evidence that such a series would be appropriate or necessary.

Likewise, Respondents have proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the underlying reasons for the changes made in the BCSE did not exist in other divisions of DHHR, were necessary to address the problems specific to that unit, and the failure to implement similar changes throughout the Department was not arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion.

The following conclusions of law are appropriate in this matter.

Conclusions of Law

1. Grievants have the burden of proving their grievance by a preponderance of the evidence. Procedural Rules of the W. Va. Educ. & State Employees Grievance Bd. 156 C.S.R. 1 § 4.21 (2004); *Howell v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res*., Docket No. 89-DHS-72 (Nov. 29, 1990). *See Holly v. Logan County Bd. of Educ*., Docket No. 96-23- 174 (Apr. 30, 1997); *Hanshaw v. McDowell County Bd. of Educ*., Docket No. 33-88-130 (Aug. 19, 1988).

2. An employee who alleges impropriety regarding a reclassification action or challenges the pay grade to which his or her position is assigned bears the burden ofproving the claim by a preponderance of the evidence. This is a difficult undertaking. *W. Va. Dep't of Health v. Blankenship*, 189 W. Va. 342, 431 S.E.2d 681 (1993); *Bennett v. Dep't of Health and Human Res.*, Docket No. 93-HHR-518 (June 23, 1995); *Johnston v. W. Va. Dep't of Health and Human Res.*, Docket No. 94-HHR-206 (June 15, 1995); *Thibault v. W. Va. Div. of Rehab. Serv.*, Docket No. 94-RS-061 (May 31, 1995); *Frame v. W. Va. Dep't of Health and Human Res.*, Docket No. 94-HHR-140 (Nov. 29, 1994).

3. If a grievant can demonstrate his or her classification or pay grade was determined in an arbitrary and capricious manner or was an abuse of discretion, then he or she has met the required burden of proof. *See Kyle v. W. Va. State Bd. of Rehab.*, Docket No. VR-88-006 (Mar. 28, 1989).

4. "Generally, an action is considered arbitrary and capricious if the agency did not rely on criteria intended to be considered, explained or reached the decision in a manner contrary to the evidence before it, or reached a decision that was so implausible that it cannot be ascribed to a difference of opinion. *See Bedford County Memorial Hosp. v. Health and Human Serv.*, 769 F.2d 1017 (4th Cir. 1985); *Yokum v. W. Va. Schools for the Deaf and the Blind*, Docket No. 96-DOE-081 (Oct. 16, 1996)." *Trimboli v. Dep't of Health and Human Res.*, Docket No. 93-HHR-322 (June 27, 1997).

5. In order to establish either a discrimination or favoritism claim asserted under the grievance statutes, an employee must prove:

(a) that he or she has been treated differently from one or more similarly-situated employee(s);

(b) that the different treatment is not related to the actual job responsibilities of the employees; and,

(c) that the difference in treatment was not agreed to in writing by the employee.

Frymier v. Higher Education Policy Comm., Nos. 32163 and 33296 (W.Va., Oct. 12, 2007); *See Bd. of Educ. v. White*, 216 W.Va. 242, 605 S.E.2d 814 (2004); *Chaddock v. Div. of Corr.,* Docket No. 04-CORR-278 (2005).

6. Grievants have failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the creation of a class series for Child Support Supervisors, but not for their classifications, was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or the result of discrimination or favoritism.

Accordingly, this grievance is **DENIED**.

Any party, or the West Virginia Division of Personnel, may appeal this decision to the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, or to the "circuit court of the county in which the grievance occurred." Any such appeal must be filed within thirty (30) days of receipt of this decision. *See* W. Va. Code § 29-6A-7 (*repealed by* Senate Bill No. 442, March 7, 2007*)* (*but see Executive Order No. 2-07*, May 8, 2007). Neither the West Virginia Education and State Employees Grievance Board nor any of its Administrative Law Judges is a party to such appeal and should not be so named. However, the appealing party is required by W. Va. Code § 29A-5-4(b) to serve a copy of the appeal petition upon the Grievance Board. The appealing party must also provide the Board with the civil action number so that the record can be prepared and properly transmitted to the appropriate circuit court.

Date: November 9, 2007

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DENISE M. SPATAFOREAdministrative Law Judge

Footnote: 1

This evidence was obtained from testimony presented in Bostic, infra. As in many of these related grievances, Respondents elected to rely on evidence introduced in previous grievance hearings, rather than present the same testimony in each individual grievance.

Footnote: 2

In 2007, the Legislature, 2007 Acts ch. 207, abolished the West Virginia Education and State Employees Grievance Board, replacing it with the Public Employees Grievance Board. W. Va. Code §§ 18-29-1 to 18-29-11 and W. Va. Code §§ 29-6A-1 to 29-6A-12 were repealed and replaced by W. Va. Code §§ 6C-2-1 to 6C-2-7 and W. Va. Code §§ 6C- 3-1 to 6C-3-6 (2007). Grievances which were pending prior to July 1, 2007, are decided under the former statutes, W. Va. Code §§ 18-29-1 to 18-29-11, for education employees, and W. Va. Code §§ 29-6A-1 to 29-6A-12, for other state and

higher education employees. See Executive Order No. 2-07, May 8, 2007. References in this decision are to the former statutes and rules, which continue to control the proceedings in this case.

Footnote: 3

Although the White decision partially overruled the discrimination test as set forth in Flint and Airhart, infra, the only portion of the test which was declared invalid was the final prong, which allowed an employer to attempt to justify the difference in treatment.